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FOREWORD
CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW AND
POLICY: 1968-20?? IN THE THICK OF THE
BATTLEFIELD FOR AMERICA'S ECONOMIC
SOUL
Kathleen E. Keest*
An adversarial model of the law is in essence a contest of
competing narratives. Each side musters its evidence and arguments
to tell a story, and tries to undermine the opponent's story. They lay
the matter before a judge or jury, and we, as a society, trust that truth
and justice emerge from that process, at least often enough for the
system to sustain the faith of the citizenry in its integrity and capacity
to deliver on that promise.
The legislative and common law norms that courts are to enforce
emerge from competing narratives, as well. Public policies emerge
from all the large and small choices that our public and private
institutions make-through action or inaction-from among the
predictive and prescriptive stories proffered by proponents on all
sides.
History is no less a battle of competing narratives. This issue of the
Georgia State University Law Review, with its focus on consumer
financial services law and policy, comes at a time when once again
we are at a crossroads in our political economy. The financial crisis
that started in 2007 convinced most people that something went
profoundly wrong. But what? And what to do about it? History, of
* Senior Policy Counsel, Center for Responsible Lending (CRL). The views expressed herein are
those of the author, and may not reflect those of CRL.
The CRL is a non-partisan, non-profit research and policy organization, affiliated with the Center
for Self-Help, a non-profit community development institution based in Durham, North Carolina, which
has provided over $5 billion of financing to low-wealth families, small businesses, and non-profit
organizations in North Carolina and around the country. Prior to her work at CRL, she was an Assistant
Attorney General and Deputy Credit Code Administrator in the Iowa Attorney General's office, and an
attorney specializing in credit regulation at the National Consumer Law Center. She began her career as
a Legal Services attorney in Iowa.
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course, is always the ultimate arbiter of such questions, but it takes a
while for its verdict to come into clear focus. In the meantime, we
write the stories that we hope will influence history's judgment.
Over the past thirty to forty-odd years, consumer financial services
policy has been one of the fields on which the competition for the
dominant economic policy narrative in the larger society has been
played. What economic principles should provide the framework for
our policies regarding the interaction between financial businesses
and their customers? To what extent should government set the rules
of the game? Who (or what) should serve as the referee on the
playing fields for the games between business and consumers?
Where you stand on those questions is probably correlated with
where you stand on the next questions. Does the market
automatically self-correct, or can it perversely create incentives for
conduct that imposes serious external costs on society? Do consumer
protection laws and regulations increase costs to consumers, reduce
the availability of credit, and stifle innovation, as the "light-touch"
and hands-off narrative goes? Or is public regulation necessary to
avoid market cheating, or exploitation of the less sophisticated party
in transactions between the professionals in the business and any
given consumer? Might it even be necessary to avoid a race to the
bottom where irresponsible, unfair and deceptive practices are
rewarded (at least in the near term) to the ultimate detriment of
consumers and fair competition, and even the economy as a whole, as
another story goes?
At the beginning of this period, 1968, the prevailing narrative was
that of a competitive market, but one that operated within the bounds
of substantive legal ground rules. The ground rules included, for
example, usury ceilings and other outside limits on terms and
practices. This approach to consumer financial services had been the
[Vol. 26:41088
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norm throughout most of the Twentieth century.' Regulation was
decided at the state level, as consumer protection historically was
considered a matter of state concern. During the decade between
1968 and 1978, it began to be a federal concern, as well. Congress
added most of the chapters in the federal consumer protection act
during that decade.2
But the country experienced serious inflation in the late-1970s to
early-1980s, and the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policy to
combat it sent interest rates to historic highs. Those interest rates
butted up against mortgage rate ceilings, and the housing and
mortgage industry sought legislative relief. Most states responded by
lifting mortgage rate caps entirely, or by enacting floating rate
ceilings. (Floating ceilings put a cap at a specified margin above a
specified market-based index, to assure that the cap will not be below
market rates.) Congress followed, deregulating mortgage lending by
preempting state laws limiting interest rates, points, and non-standard
terms such as adjustable rates, balloon payments, and negative
amortization.
3
1. For an excellent overview of the early Twentieth century reform efforts on small loan lending,
see generally Combating the Shark, Symposium, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1-205 (Winter 1941). (It is
especially interesting in light of the current debate over payday lending. This business model is
strikingly similar to one used at the turn of the Twentieth century that was the object of that early reform
movement.) A good general history of the development of consumer financial services regulation up to
the late 1960s is BARBARA CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1966).
2. Most of the titles that compose the federal Consumer Credit Protection chapter in the U.S. Code
were enacted between 1968 and 1978. Subch. , Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
(1968), including the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1974) and Consumer Lease Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1667 (1976); Subch. H1, Restrictions on Garnishment, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1968); Subch. III, Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970); Subch. IV, Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 15 U.S.C. §
1691 (1974); Subchapter V, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1977); Subchapter
VI, Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1978). The federal financial regulators were given
authority to define unfair and deceptive acts and practices for financial institutions by regulation in
1975. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
3. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDA) preempted state
interest rate and points caps on first lien mortgages in 1980. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (1980). The
Altemative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA) preempted state laws limiting non-traditional
mortgage terms in 1982. 12 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq (1982). There were no substantive federal substitutes
for the preempted state law, thus effectively deregulating the mortgage market. See generally
ELIZABETH RENUART, KATHLEEN E. KEEST, ET AL.,, THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION,
AND INDUSTRY ABUSES, §§ 3.10-3.11 (4th ed. 2009). For a history of this period, including the state law
responses to the record-high interest rates, see Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL "
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Deregulation as to substantive terms, then, began as a practical
solution to temporary market conditions. But it stayed in the public
policy debate as the more dominant narrative over the following
thirty years as a matter of philosophy. Then, once again, the larger
economy experienced a seismic shock. In 2007-2008, our financial
system came close to collapse, triggering an international economic
crisis and the Great Recession.
In a hundred years, history may judge this most recent financial
market meltdown as the end of an era, the beginning of the end of an
era, or just as a bump in the road. Congress is currently considering
what, if anything, to do to prevent a recurrence, 4 as is the rest of the
world. We don't have a winner yet in the battle of competing
narratives over the causes and implications of the crisis, but the
debate is in process, and it is making for a very noisy and smoky
battlefield in Washington-so noisy and smoky that it's still hard to
see clearly now. "It was 'short-termism' and greed by the financial
sector, forsaking sound business practices in pursuit of short term
profits and growth." "It was the government's fault: too much
intervention and mis-directed policies." "It was government doing
too little to curb reckless, irresponsible, and abusive behavior in the
market." "It was the borrowers' fault: they bought more house than
they could afford." "It was everybody's failure to come to grips with
the increasing financial insecurity of American households." "It was
the Greenspan Fed's monetary policy of keeping interest rates too
low too long." "It was a global glut of money, looking for higher
returns and finding it in mortgage-backed securities based on houses
on cul-de-sacs in the sunnier parts of America." "It was all of the
above and more."
While Congress is debating specific reform proposals, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), established in 2009 to
"examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial
Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity
Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473 (2000).
4. The House of Representatives passed a financial reform package in December 2009. The Wall
Street Report and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009). The Senate
Banking Committee is in negotiations as this is being written.
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and economic crisis in the United States,"5 just held its first hearing
at the time of this writing.6 The FCIC is charged with examining
some twenty-two "areas of inquiry related to the financial crisis,"
including:
" fraud and abuse in the financial sector, including fraud
and abuse towards consumers in the mortgage sector;
" Federal and State financial regulators, including the
extent to which they enforced, or failed to enforce
statutory, regulatory, or supervisory requirements;
" the global imbalance of savings, international capital
flows, and fiscal imbalances of various governments;
" monetary policy and the availability and terms of credit;
* accounting practices, including, mark-to-market and
fair value rules, and treatment of off-balance sheet
vehicles;
" tax treatment of financial products and investments;
" capital requirements and regulations on leverage and
liquidity, including the capital structures of regulated
and non-regulated financial entities;
" credit rating agencies in the financial system, including,
reliance on credit ratings by financial institutions and
Federal financial regulators, the use of credit ratings in
financial regulation, and the use of credit ratings in the
securitization markets;
* lending practices and securitization, including the
originate-to-distribute model for extending credit and
transferring risk;
* affiliations between insured depository institutions and
securities, insurance, and other types of nonbanking
companies;
5. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 § 5(a), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
6. The FCIC held its first public hearing on January 13, 2010. http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/01-13-
2010.php. The FCIC website explains that "[iun the wake of the most significant financial crisis since the
Great Depression, the President signed into law on May 20, 2009, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009, creating the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission." http://www.fcic.gov/about.
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" the concept that certain institutions are 'too-big-to-fail'
and its impact on market expectations;
* corporate governance, including the impact of company
conversions from partnerships to corporations;
" compensation structures;
" changes in compensation for employees of financial
companies, as compared to compensation for others
with similar skill sets in the labor market;
" the legal and regulatory structure of the United States
housing market;
" derivatives and unregulated financial products and
practices, including credit default swaps;
* short-selling;
" financial institution reliance on numerical models,
including risk models and credit ratings;
" the legal and regulatory structure governing financial
institutions, including the extent to which the structure
creates the opportunity for financial institutions to
engage in regulatory arbitrage;
" the legal and regulatory structure governing investor
and mortgagor protection;
* financial institutions and government-sponsored
enterprises; and
" the quality of due diligence undertaken by financial
institutions.7
It is possible that there will be few acquittals from this list of
possible culprits, and more may be added to the list before all is said
and done. Probably most of them were contributors in varying
degrees, and undoubtedly they interacted in a way that amplified
negative consequences far beyond the damage each of them would
have wrought standing alone.
But how did we manage to create so many storm cells at roughly
the same time--cells that would merge into this Perfect Storm? The
current Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Sheila
7. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 § 5(c)(I)(A)-(V).
[Vol. 26:4
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Bair (and one of the few early warning voices in official Washington)
testified at the first FCIC hearing that
[t]his crisis represents the culmination of a decades-long process
by which our national policies have distorted economic activity
away from savings and toward consumption, away from
investment in our industrial base and public infrastructure and
toward housing, away from the real sectors of our economy and
toward the financial sector. No single policy is responsible for
these distortions, and no one reform can restore balance to our
economy. 8
That is a fair assessment, but it still leaves questions of which
policies? How and why did those distortions become the norm, and
why did they have such lasting power?
It may help to view these questions against the larger canvas of
trends in the culture at the same time-in our economic academy, our
corporate culture, the law, and in politics over roughly the same time
span. All of these trends converged into a shift in the zeitgeist that led
to a reversal of the dominant narrative-the transformation of the
market into "The Market"--a cultural, political, and even legal force
of its own.
As we listen to broadcast news and commentary, we almost can
hear the capital letters--"The Market" as a proper noun, and
anthropomorphized. "The Market" was pleased by this event ....
"The Market" was displeased by that speech .... "The Market" was
jittery after something did or did not happen. Indeed, some
commentators have been struck by the almost theological overtones
8. The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm 'n
(Jan. 14, 2010) (Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation),
available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0114-Bair.pdf.
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to our cultural embrace of "The Market"-"omnipotent,
omniscient... and omnipresent."
9
That transformation may have begun in the halls of the academy
where our economists and our MBAs are trained. In economics
departments, the "efficient markets" or laissez-faire school became
the dominant orthodoxy over the past four decades. Under this school
of economic thought, markets are self-correcting, hence best left
alone. Agents in the market (that would be the people involved) are
rational actors. 10 The standard methodology became mathematical
modeling, rather than real world study of human and institutional
behavior. The assumptions plugged into those mathematical models,
in turn, were predicated upon those efficient market axioms.
There was a corollary in our business schools, as the premise that
the sole responsibility of a corporation is to maximize profits for its
shareholders came to carry the day." "The Market" migrated into the
law, as well, with the rise of the Law and Economics school, which
includes influential appellate judges like Judge Richard Posner
among its proponents.
Arguably the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 represented not
just the political embrace of faith in the "The Market" by a winning
candidate, but its embrace as a fundamental value of the culture. This
is part of the reason he is perceived as a transformational president,
9. Harvey Cox, Notes & Comments, The Market as God: Living in the New Dispensation,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1999, at 19. E.g. THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME
CAPITALISM, MARKET POPULISM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (Doubleday 2000).
10. My own perspective is that this fundamental axiom assumes away reality, since human history is
full of human irrationality. And however rigorous the steps that follow may be, that assuming away
reality part is bound to come back and bite. One of my favorite examples of the fallacy in play: After I
talked about widespread flawed underwriting and appraisals in the non-prime mortgage market at a
meeting in early 2005, a fellow panelist who was an official at a nonprime lender could not contain
himself: "It doesn't happen. This is a business, and that would be stupid business." Obviously, I must
have been mistaken that The Market might such stupidity to infect itself. (Today, however, widespread
reckless underwriting is almost universally conceded to be a cause of the mortgage meltdown. See, e.g.
Structured Finance in Focus, A Short Guide to Subprime, The Subprime Decline-Putting it in Context,
Moody's Investors Service, March 2008 ("The subprime crisis is largely a product of increasingly
aggressive mortgage loan underwriting standards adopted as competition to maintain origination volume
intensified amid a cooling national housing market.") (available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-
08/s71308-58.pdf).
1I. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, NEW YORK
TIMES MAGAZINE at 17 (September 13, 1970), available at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/
libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html (last visited March 6, 2010).
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irrespective of one's views on whether it was for better or worse. Its
political message-trust the private sector instead of government,
rather than valuing both, and trying to design business and political
processes aimed at assuring that both sectors warrant the public trust.
Over the past thirty years it seems as if economics was politicized,
while politics and public policy were "Marketized."
But, of course, there have been competing narratives on all these
fronts throughout this era. And today, in light of the crisis, they are
being heard more. Behavioral economists are making rapid progress
at getting their perspective into the mainstream of academia and the
policy world.12 The general press has begun to bring them into the
national conversation, as well. 13 (At the risk of oversimplifying,
behavioral economists believe that people-on both sides of a
transaction-aren't always rational. Radical, I know, but there it is.)
In the business world, we are beginning to hear more that corporate
responsibility is to both shareholders and stakeholders, and not
measured simply by next quarter's profit and loss statements.
Recently the CEO of PepsiCo attributed the financial meltdown to a
"maniacal focus on the shareholders."' 4 Her suggested cure for
business: "our new P & L actually says revenue, less costs of good
sold, less costs to society-and that's your real profit."' 5 Even some
12. See, e.g. Michael S. Barr, Sendhill Mullainathan, & Eldon Shafir, Behaviorally Informed
Financial Services Regulation, Oct. 2008, http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafbehavioral_v5.pdf. Mr.
Barr was subsequently appointed to be Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Institutions. See
also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ. Press 2008). Mr. Sunstein was appointed by President Obama to
the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
Controversial, but almost universal, credit card practices that Congress recently took aim at with
the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. Ill-
24, 123 Stat. 1734, cannot be explained by efficient market theory (except as a massive "market
failure"), but are well explained under other economic analytical frames. See Joshua M. Frank, What
Does the Credit Card Market Have In Common with a Peacock?, LYDIAN PAYMENTS J., Nov. 2009, at
24-40, available at http://pymnts.com/assets/Shared/LPJ-Voll-Nol .pdf.
13. E.g. Dan Ariely, author of PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (HarperCollins 2008) and a behavioral economist is frequently seen and heard in the popular
business press.
14. PepsiCo CEO: Refine Profit and Loss, NPR Marketplace, Jan. 29, 2010,
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/01/29/pm-davos-pepsi-ceo-q/.
15. Id. See generally, MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE
CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY (Berrett Koehler 2001).
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of those within the industry are expressing second thoughts, 16 as has
the most famous "light-touch" federal regulator. Former Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan admitted to a House panel
looking at the role of federal regulators in the crisis that he was
shocked to find "a flaw in the model that defines how the world
works"l 7-in other words, the world view behind his regulatory
laissez-faire philosophy. On the Law and Economics front, Judge
Richard Posner, one of its foremost proponents has revisited some of
his core economic assumptions, as well.
18
We've seen that deceptive or unfair practices can be good for
market share and share value in the short term, so the competitive
pressures can mean a race to the bottom, if there is no regulatory
floor. 19 Citibank, for example, tried to voluntarily abandon the
controversial universal default practice in its credit card business, but
reversed itself when revenues declined, and no one else followed.2 °
So, in the wake of the crisis, the concept of regulation as a safety net
16. John Robbins, former chair of the Mortgage Bankers Association, said: "We forgot about our
customers, and making money and our commission checks were more important." Kate Berry,
Wachovia Alum has Tips for an Industry Rebound, Am. BANKER, Sept. 15, 2008, available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/73_183/-361981-I .html.
17. His testimony on this and other aspects of his consumer protection philosophy while Chair of the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) is quoted in Testimony of Prof. Patricia McCoy, Consumer Protections in
Financial Services: Past Problems, Future Solutions Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, I 11th Cong. 17-18 (2009), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfin?
FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_)-1 lbe680d-04db-42cc-89bf-7fe4ffe4d9cd&WitnessID =
b6ba6O4a-d441-43e3-9951-lfbab4blle57. See also Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So
Wrong? NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 6,2009, at 36.
18. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO
DEPRESSION xii (Harvard Univ. Press 2009) ("We are learning from it that we need a more active and
intelligent government to keep our model of a capitalist economy from running off the rails. The
movement to deregulate the financial industry went too far by exaggerating the resilience--the self-
healing powers-of laissez-faire capitalism.").
19. Compare the 1935 observation of Frank Hyneman Knight in THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION 42
(Transaction Publishers 1997) ('[T]here is truth in the allegation that unregulated competition places a
premium on deceit and corruption.") with the admission of FRB Chairman Bemanke of the role they
contributed to the recent crisis. See Statement of Chairman Ben Bemanke, FRB Press Release, July 14,
2008, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bernankeregz20080714.htm. (unfair and
deceptive practices by lenders resulted in loans that were "inappropriate for or misled the borrower.")
20. See, e.g. Elizabeth Warren, Opinion: Wall Street's Race to the Bottom, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
2010, at A19. Universal default allowed credit card issuers to raise interest rates on their card holders
existing balances to penalty rates that were often double what the rate was when the debt was incurred-
without the consumer ever having breached his contract with the issuer. The extra interest was very
profitable.
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is coming back. Whether the current debates mean another paradigm
shift of the magnitude of the one at the front edge of this era is yet to
be seen. But it is in play.
As it happens, the professional careers of most of the authors
represented in this series also span most or all of this same period,
and consumer financial services law has been their area of
specialization. They have not been mere academic observers, either.
Most have contributed to the development of the field. They, too,
have stories that help illustrate consumer financial services law as
part of the battleground over the economic soul of the country over
the past generation. Professor Budnitz chronicles the growth of what
was a rarity in the field we began our careers--consumer financial
services lawyers who represented actual consumers, and brought their
clients' stories into the record and into these policy debates.
Professors Alces and Greenfield's article revives some basic
principles of contract law that have often seemed hard to get traction
in a Law and Economics environment. Professors Miller and Harrell
weigh in directly with their views as to some of the current policy
debates arising out the crisis, adding their narratives to the many
already out there, and many more yet to come.
21
But the last chapter on this debate at the intersection of politics,
policy, law, and economics has yet to be written. So tune in again
later-to see what the coming of age story of consumer financial
services looks like from perspective of history.
21. In the interest of full disclosure, my colleagues and I at the CRL are among those who have
offered explanations as to what did, and did not, contribute to the crisis. See, e.g., Testimony of Julia
Gordon Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n (Jan. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0l13-Gordon.pdf; Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The
Genesis of the Current Economic Crisis Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
(2008) (Statement of Eric Stein, Senior Vice President, CRL); Kathleen E. Keest, The Subprime
Housing Crisis Symposium: The Way Ahead: A Framework for Policy Responses, Dec. 9, 2008,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislationfhe-Way-Ahead-A-Framework-
for-Policy-Responses.html; Testimony of Prof. Patricia McCoy, supra note 17, at 17-18.
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